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This paper analyzes the conduct of publicly owned monopolistic utilities regulated by
a voluntary sunshine regulatory model (i.e. publication of the performances of utilities).
In particular, we examine the behaviour of Dutch drinking water utilities before and af-
ter the introduction of the sunshine regulation. As during the period 1992-2006 several
alternative regulatory reforms including privatization, yardstick competition and pro￿t
regulation were also seriously considered, we examine how the discussion and possible
implementation of these reforms in￿ uenced the behaviour of the utilities. By decom-
posing pro￿t change into its economic drivers (quantity e⁄ect, price e⁄ect, operating
e¢ ciency, technical progress, scale, etc.), our results suggest that in an appropriate po-
litical and institutional context, sunshine regulation can be an e⁄ective and appropriate
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1mean of insuring that publicly organised services are e¢ ciently and pro￿tably provided.
In methodological terms, the pro￿t decomposition is extended to robust (i.e. allowing for
stochastic elements) and conditional (i.e. accounting for heterogeneity) non-parametric
e¢ ciency measures.
Keywords: Regulation, Drinking water utilities, Pro￿t decomposition, Data Envel-
opment Analysis
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1 Introduction
The regulation of public and private utilities changed signi￿cantly over the last 20 years as
new ideas and paradigms were developed and dismissed (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002). How-
ever, privatisation and regulation with an appropriate form of incentive regulation is widely
considered to be an appropriate policy response. For a particular sector, the transition from
one regulatory model to another also involves heated discussions. These debates often create
instability in the regulated sector which in turn in￿ uences pro￿ts, investments, performance
and prices (Parker, 1999). In this paper, we therefore consider the case of the publicly owned
Dutch drinking water sector, which between 1992 and 2006 has experienced several abortive
regulatory initiatives. However, this regulatory reform process has ultimately resulted in the
retention of public ownership and the implementation of light-handed sunshine regulation
regime. Therefore, consideration of the performance of the Dutch drinking water sector over
this period allows a useful example of performance change in a utility sector that has not
followed the more conventional approach of privatisation and establishment of an incentive
regulation regime (cfr. England and Wales).
The debate on reforming the Dutch drinking water utilities is part of a broader debate
among both academics and practitioners (Bauer, 2005). The literature focuses especially
on the privatization issue, regulatory problems (e.g. Ugaz and Price, 2003) or institutional
structures (e.g. Spiller and Tommasi, 2004). Although connected to this branch of the lit-
erature, the focus of our analysis lies on the regulatory incentives which could arise from a
(voluntary) publication of performances. In 1997, after several years of intense debate on the
privatization of the Dutch drinking water sector resulting in a decision not to privatise, the
Association of Dutch Water Companies (Vewin) started a sunshine regulation program with
voluntary participation. In a sunshine regulatory model, the outcome of a benchmarking
exercise (i.e. the comparison of utilities) is made publicly available so as to embarrass the
least performing entities and to put the best performing entities into the limelight (for an
extensive discussion of Dutch sunshine regulation, Wubben and Hulsink, 2003). Although
sunshine regulation seems to result in signi￿cant e¢ ciency gains (Dijkgraaf et al., 2007; De
Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2008), since 1992 the Dutch government also considered, but did not
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petition (i.e. using the benchmark outcomes for determining maximum prices or revenues),
pro￿t regulation, and self-regulation of public companies. Furthermore, Dutch citizens, liv-
ing in a country with a long history of public water management, are conscious of their role
as indirect owners of the public drinking water utilities, and this results in edifying debates
in the (￿nancial and academic) press on the excessive pro￿ts, prices and returns on invest-
ment (e.g. van Damme and Mulder, 2006; NRC Handelsblad, 2007). Therefore, we can
consider the Dutch drinking water sector as an interesting example where privatisation and
the establishment of an incentive regulation regime were considered, but ultimately public
ownership was maintained and an alternative sunshine regulation system was implemented.
We therefore analyze this behavioral change using the non-parametric pro￿t decomposition
approach developed by Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell (1999, 2008). Inspired by their approach,
we decompose pro￿t change to identify its drivers (price, productivity, scale, etc.), and, in
particular, to identify the conduct of the regional drinking water monopolists with respect
to the regulatory changes.
This paper contributes to the literature by tackling six di⁄erent issues. Firstly, we analyze
the e⁄ectiveness of the voluntary sunshine regulatory model, in which (at ￿rst under the treat
of privatization) ￿rms committed themselves to publicize their performance. By comparing
pro￿ts, quantity and price e⁄ects before and after the introduction of sunshine regulation
and by pointing to di⁄erent trends in the data, we shed light on the impact of the sunshine
model on ￿rm performance. Secondly, although the article does not intend to provide an
exhaustive description of the Dutch drinking water sector (see Wubben and Hulsink, 2003;
Kuks, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2007), it reviews the various debates on reform of the Dutch
drinking water sector since 1992. Indeed, besides the introduction of sunshine regulation
the sector faced discussion about privatization, yardstick competition, pro￿t regulation, etc.
Regulatory shifts and the preceding discussions are also found in other sectors (e.g. postal
services, telecommunications, railway sector). However, the interesting characteristic of the
Dutch drinking water sector is the extended time period (1992-2008) over which these de-
bates have continued, and the ultimate retention of public ownership. Moreover, the wide
ranging debate touched the very nature of drinking water provision by considering, private
versus public water supply provision and how to design incentives for those private or pub-
lic utilities. This analysis suggests that the regional drinking water monopolies anticipate
potential regulatory changes and their resulting change in conduct subsequently delays or
postpones the planned legislation. Our third contribution naturally follows, as we analyze
the Dutch drinking water sector to investigate the behavior of the regional monopolists in this
frequently changing regulatory environment. Monopolists can, in comparison to competitive
￿rms, more easily seize the opportunity to increase prices and make excess pro￿ts. Thus, it
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pro￿ts a⁄ect the behavior (in terms of pro￿ts, productivity, prices and activity) of regional
monopolists. As a fourth contribution, an extensive panel data set (1992-2006) allows us to
focus on overall e¢ ciency by jointly considering the e¢ cient use of both operating and capital
costs. As such, the e¢ ciency assessment in this paper is complementary to previous studies
(e.g. Dijkgraaf et al., 2007; De Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2008), which only consider operating
cost e¢ ciency. Fifthly, the paper directly responds to the current debate in the Dutch (￿-
nancial and academic) press as to whether the recent pro￿ts in the drinking water sector are
excessive, by closely examining the drivers of these pro￿t changes. Following Grifell-TatjØ
and Lovell (1999, 2008), we identify seven drivers for pro￿t change: changes in (1) output
prices (for both domestic and non-domestic customers), (2) input prices (for labor, capital
and other inputs), (3) technical progress or regress, (4) catch-up by ine¢ cient ￿rms, (5) scale
economies, (6) improved resource (i.e. input) mix and (7) improved product (i.e. output)
mix. Moreover, given our panel data set, we are able to scrutinize the pro￿t change and
to determine the contribution of its seven drivers over the entire 1992-2006 period. To do
so, the paper interprets the pro￿t decomposition model of Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell (1999)
with an input-orientation (i.e. for a given production of outputs, minimize input usage).
As an input-oriented model is also natural for other industries with exogenous outputs (e.g.
governmental services, health care, natural monopolies), our extension is not limited to the
present application. Finally, we extend the basic e¢ ciency evaluation model of Grifell-TatjØ
and Lovell (1999, 2008) to a more advanced non-parametric model. In particular, we design
a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model which accounts for uncertainty in the sample
(i.e. stochastic elements). These robust order-m e¢ ciency estimates (Cazals et al., 2002)
allow for measurement errors, atypical observations and noise. By also employing the global
DEA e¢ ciencies proposed in Daraio and Simar (2007b) we incorporate heterogeneity in the
e¢ ciency analysis. As such, we account for the exogenous environment of the drinking water
utilities. In addition, in a panel data set, we develop a non-parametric model which accounts
for technical progress and regress.
The paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we review the various debates on the
regulatory model in the Dutch drinking water sector. Section 3 presents the input-oriented
pro￿t decomposition model while Section 4 outlines the methodology for estimating the
unobserved quantities which are required for the pro￿t decomposition. Section 5 discusses
the particular application and its results. In the ￿nal section we o⁄er our conclusions.
42 Regulatory discussions in the Dutch drinking water
sector
The Dutch drinking water sector has experienced some remarkable discussions on its structure
and the very nature of the regulatory model. Debates between advocates and opponents of
privatization and strict regulation, have created several periods of instability in the Dutch
drinking water sector. However, ultimately the sector has remained in public ownership and
has come to be regulated with relatively light-handed sunshine regulation. Nevertheless, by
analyzing several sector publications (mainly Waterspiegel published by the Association of
Dutch Water Companies (Vewin), the annual accounts of the utilities and opinion articles in
the Dutch ￿nancial press), we are able to distinguish four relatively distinct but nonetheless
interrelated periods, which were characterized by somewhat di⁄erent government policies
and varying levels of instability. These ￿ndings are summarized on the time line in Figure
1. This section does not intend to exhaustively describe the history of the Dutch drinking
water sector (see Kuks, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2007), but rather it summarizes changes in and
debates about its structure and regulatory model.
** The period 1992-1997 **
Motivated by the Washington consensus and following the privatization waves in Western
Europe, by the beginning of the 1990 the Dutch government implemented privatization and
liberalization in several network sectors (e.g. telecommunication and energy sectors). An-
ticipating their own privatization, the Dutch drinking water utilities strove to increase their
￿nancial strength so as to be better prepared for the expected changes with respect to pri-
vatization and competition in the market (several annual accounts cite this). Indeed, if the
government would decide to privatize the sector, the utilities realized that they would need to
be ￿ attractive￿to draw investments. As a result, pro￿ts were increased by raising water prices
for both domestic and non-domestic customers, and these pro￿ts were justi￿ed as necessary
to fund capital improvements. In addition, higher pro￿ts were deemed necessary to increase
the capital ratio (i.e. shareholders￿equity to liabilities) as it was anticipated that leverage
levels would need to be lower under private ownership if private bank loans were to replace
government debt as the primary source of debt funding. This resulted in a dramatic increase
in economic pro￿ts. This increase is illustrated by the fact that in the sample of companies
employed in our below empirical analysis, real (in 1995 prices) aggregate economic pro￿ts
(calculated by total revenues minus total costs (detailed below) and di⁄ering from account-
ing pro￿ts reported by the utilities) increased dramatically from the equivalent of 4.3 million
euros in 1992 to 177.4 million euros in 1996.









- Debate on the privatization of network industries
- Large profits to increase attractiveness for investments
- Significant increase in real drinking water price
- Introduction of the voluntary benchmark by Vewin
- Use of 1997 data for first public benchmark
1999 - Publication of 1997 benchmark
- Use of 2000 data for second public benchmark
- Use of 2003 data for third public benchmark with a decreased participation
- Moratorium on private investments: public sector by law
- Use of 2006 data for fourth public benchmark
- Benchmarking is obligatory (in place in 2008)
- Attention to ‘ excessive’  profits and increased capital ratio
- Investments are paid by cash flow (results in lower capital costs)
- Publication of 2000 benchmark
- Debate on the ownership in the drinking water sector (till 2003)
- Debate on independent regulator and yardstick competition (till 2004)
- Increasing product diversification and emphasize on innovations
- Publication of 2003 benchmark
- Focus on environmental issues and innovations
- Publication of 2006 benchmark
- Debate on dividend policy towards shareholders
Time
Figure 1: Time line
monopolistic nature. A report for the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environ-
ment and the Ministry of Economic A⁄airs stated a clear relationship between monopolistic
drinking water provision, which did not face price regulation, and the costs and prices for
drinking water. The presence of a monopoly prevented any incentive to produce e¢ ciently.
Moreover, the reports authors argued that the introduction of incentive regulation would
reduce water prices by at least 7% (Dijkgraaf et al., 1997). However, despite this analysis,
as well as the sector￿ s ￿nancial preparation for privatisation, there was in fact insu¢ cient
political support in the mid 1990s for the government to be able to actually implement pri-
vatisation of the sector. Given this political reality, policy makers sought a policy response
that would allow for e¢ ciency improvements while remaining public ownership, in at least
the interim before future potential privatisation.
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Initially, the Dutch drinking water sector organization Vewin was strongly opposed to any
idea of strict incentive regulation. However, thanks to political pressures to increase trans-
parency and e¢ ciency in the sector and in order to avoid privatization which might become
necessary without e¢ ciency improvements (following the English and Welsh utilities), in 1997
Vewin started a voluntary benchmarking scheme which was used for sunshine regulation (Wa-
terspiegel, 2001). As our results below suggest, this sunshine regulation was a landmark for
the sector and dramatically altered the behaviour and performance of the water utilities.
Benchmarking is the comparison of utilities on one or several indicators and is applied in
various regulatory regimes including those based on sunshine regulation and yardstick com-
petition. The latter denotes the use of benchmarking results to determine maximum prices
or revenues (as applied by the independent regulator in the privatized English and Welsh
drinking water sector), the former uses benchmarking to ￿ embarrass￿the least performing
companies and to put the best performing in the limelight. The e⁄ectiveness of sunshine
regulation depends on both internal and external carrots and sticks. In the Dutch drinking
water sector, the internal incentives arrive from increased transparency, the di⁄usion of best
practices by sector-speci￿c workshops, improved knowledge of the priorities in the company
and ￿nancial rewards for managers if they are able to improve the utility￿ s position in the
sunshine rankings. In addition, in their annual accounts the drinking water utilities explicitly
set targets of their desired performance (e.g. a place in the top-three on all benchmarked
issues). External incentives are driven by public interest in the water sector as the media
heavily report the sunshine results. In addition, the water companies are owned by the
provincial and municipal governments which in turn are elected by the citizens in the service
area of the utility. As is common practice in the Netherlands, in the remainder of the text
we will mix the terms of ￿ sunshine regulation￿and ￿ benchmarking￿ .
The Vewin benchmark is implemented in a three year cycle by which in the ￿rst two years
only costs are compared (these results are only internally published among the drinking water
utilities) and in the third year an external ￿ benchmark￿is generated which considers ￿gures
and ranking on quality, service, environmental issues and costs. The benchmark provides
information at company level, process level (e.g. production, sales, distribution) and sub-
process level (e.g. cost per km. mains). The ￿rst public benchmark considers 1997 data and
was published in March 1999. Two years of internally benchmarking later, the second public
benchmark analyses 2000 data and was published in November 2001. The third issue uses
2003 data (published November 2004) while the latest version considers 2006 information
(published September 2007).
Considering operating cost e¢ ciency, the few studies on the Dutch drinking water sec-
tor indicated some remarkable e⁄ects of the benchmark (Kuks, 2006; Dijkgraaf et al., 2007;
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creased, the sector experienced an e¢ ciency increase of 23% between 1997 and 2006. In
addition, triggered by the increased transparency and by the political pressures to create
a drinking water company per province (because 100,000 connections was considered as a
minimum size requirement and because of the strategic groundwater management duties of
the 12 provinces) intensi￿ed merger activity arose from 1996 onwards. Thus, as a result, the
number of drinking water companies halved between 1992 and 2007. However, especially the
merged companies are evolving to even bigger companies due to additional mergers. Thus,
of the 20 water companies in 1992, 6 utilities did not merge during the sample time period.
Although the merging companies are claiming economies of scale, this is not found by recent
empirical work (De Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2007). Conversely, by decreasing the number of
reference observations in the benchmark, the mergers are reducing the potential e⁄ectiveness
of benchmarking in identifying underperformance, a concern which is similar to that which
has been observed in the privatized English and Welsh water industry.
** The period 2000-2003 **
After the introduction of sunshine regulation in 1997, the sector experienced a period of
relative stability. Nevertheless, after two benchmarking reports with 1997 and 2000 data,
in the period 2001-2003 the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
again created uncertainty with regard to the status of the drinking water utilities by redis-
cussing ownership in the water sector (Eigendomswet). However, after two years of discus-
sions (2001-2003), the apparent lack of political support for privatisation, and prompted by
positive results from the sunshine regulation regime, by the end of 2003, the Dutch parlia-
ment reserved the drinking water sector as a public domain, which implied a moratorium
on private investments. On balance, this policy decision was justi￿ed on the grounds that
the sunshine benchmarking system was working to substantially improve e¢ ciency, therefore
making privatisation and formal incentive regulation unnecessary. The Dutch drinking water
utilities therefore continue to be structured as Public Limited Companies (PLCs) in which
the provinces and municipalities own the assets.1 It is notable that the provinces are also
responsible for regulating drinking water tari⁄s and, therefore, con￿ icts in interest may arise.
Linked with and started simultaneously with the ownership discussion, the government
created additional instability in the monopolistic sector by proposing a new law which would
have applied a form of yardstick competition to the sector. As such, the results of the
benchmark (in the strict sense of the word) would no longer be used for light-handed sun-
shine regulation, but would instead be used for setting tari⁄s by an independent regulator.
1As the sector has never experienced nationalization, part private ownership has been maintained in one
￿rm as an historical legacy.
8Moreover this regulator would carry out the (obligatory) benchmark instead of the sector
organization Vewin. At this time, many drinking water utilities feared an over-emphasize on
output prices and detailed these concerns in their annual accounts.
While the idea of establishing yardstick competition was (temporarily) buried by the
beginning 2004 as a new Minister took o¢ ce, it seems that the uncertainty relatively to
the regulatory model undermined the willingness to participate in the voluntary benchmark.
Whereas in 1997 and 2000, respectively, 78 and 71 percent of the companies participated, in
2003 this decreased to only two thirds of the utilities. Although all companies are o¢ cially in
favor of benchmarking, in their annual accounts some companies commented on the imprecise
methodology (e.g. measuring costs per m3 or per connection could deliver signi￿cant di⁄erent
results). Others noted that they were merging or were about to merge and, therefore, ￿ had
other priorities￿ . However, more likely than the cited reasons, the instability resulting from
the potential change in regulatory model could have encouraged the companies to game the
expected regulator by not publicizing cost information which could be used against them if
maximum prices were set by an independant regulator (Jamasb et al., 2003). Therefore, they
did not participate the benchmark.
Although the benchmark was initially established as a voluntary project, given the rela-
tively poor participation in the 2003 benchmark, the Dutch government decided in December
2006 to make the benchmark obligatory (with e⁄ect from 2008). This may have encouraged
all the ￿rms to voluntarily engage in the 2006 benchmark, but the government￿ s decision to
maintain the sunshine regulatory benchmark controlled by Vewin rather than establishing a
yardstick regime administered by an independant regulator is also signi￿cant.
In 2001, several utilities￿annual reports proudly mention the improved product diversi-
￿cation as they were increasingly delivering industrial water in various varieties. By using
decentralized and customer tailored puri￿cation processes, the utility is able to boost produc-
tion for industrial water customers and also reduce overall treatment costs. In the following
years (up to 2006), product and process innovation becomes ￿ hot￿as the government classi￿es
the water sector as one of the key-innovation sectors to attain the EU Lisbon Strategy (i.e.
the EU should become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge economy in the world
by 2010).
** The period 2004-2006 **
During the period 2004-2005, the drinking water sector generally experienced a period of
relative stability as the major debates were settled. This can to a certain extent be attributed
to the responsible Minister who largely endorsed the viewpoints of the sector association
Vewin and its administration of the sunshine benchmarking regime. Economic regulatory
concerns are much less prominent during this period and environmental issues and innovative
9procedures and processes were therefore discussed more.
However at the beginning of 2004, for the ￿rst time and only very brie￿ y, the discussion in
the water sector focused on the absence of ￿nancial bene￿ts, resulting from the benchmark,
for the captive customers. The issue was initially dealt with by incorporating pro￿t and
capital ratios in the 2003 benchmark. More than two years later, after some critical articles
in the press on ￿ excessive￿pro￿ts and signi￿cantly increased capital ratios, public awareness
increased again. Indeed, for the sample of ￿rms in our below analysis, real (in 1995 prices)
aggregate economic pro￿ts increased from 161.0 million euro in 2002 to 214.0 million euros
in 2004 and 240.3 million euro in 2005. As a response, the sector gave increasing attention to
drinking water prices in sector publications but, in contrast to the 2003 benchmark edition,
the 2006 benchmark did not include any ￿gures on pro￿ts or capital ratios. Nevertheless, in
contrast to the preceding years aggregate real economic pro￿ts decreased to 208.8 million euro
in 2006. In addition, the sector stressed that until 2000 drinking water prices increased more
than the consumer price index (CPI), but from 2000 onwards drinking water prices increased
less than CPI. However, given that economic pro￿ts in the industry remain very high relative
to their level in the early 1990s, we would argue that these below in￿ ation increases in water
prices have not substantially eroded the high levels of economic pro￿tability achieved in the
sector.
Given the continued high pro￿ts in the industry, by 2006, the discussion shifted to the
distribution of dividends. As drinking water companies are continuing to make large pro￿ts,
debt levels have continued to decline. The public utilities point to the necessity and advan-
tages of making (large) pro￿ts. Indeed, they argue that besides increasing the equity/debt
ratio, pro￿ts are used to fund further capital investments. Therefore, investments are paid for
by cash ￿ ow instead of borrowing money. This decreases the interest charges twice: on the
one hand thanks to a lower interest rate (real interest rates decreased since 2001 in general
and higher capital ratios further decreased the interest rate for particular utilities), on the
other hand thanks to a lower borrowed sum. This in turn would decrease the drinking water
tari⁄s in the long run.
For all utilities but one, the shareholders￿meeting can decide on the payment of a dividend
to the shareholders (i.e. mainly the provinces and municipalities). Some utilities decided not
to return a dividend, whereas other opted for one percent point above the 10-year guild bond,
still others return up to 57% of the pro￿ts to the shareholders. Interestingly, whereas the
sector normally prefers self-regulation, several utilities have actually called for governmental
regulation of dividend policies. However, the recent Drinking Water Law (2008) only states
that the Minister and the sector will enter into an agreement. Thus, the issue of high
pro￿ts in the industry and the appropriate distribution to government (shareholders) or
water consumers through lower prices remains a highly relevant issue in the industry.
10In sum, our brief review of the introduction of light-handed sunshine regulation and the
various regulatory discussions over the past two decades suggests that the Dutch drinking
water sector provides a somewhat unusual example that warrants careful analysis. This is the
case, because the industry has undergone substantial mergers and adopted an alternative reg-
ulatory regime, despite the fact that it has not been privatised. Moreover, it has dramatically
increased its pro￿tability, which previous papers and general policy debate suggest may be
attributable to improved e¢ ciency/productivity and/or substantial increases in water prices
for consumers. Given this, it is interesting to look behind the pro￿t change by decomposing
it into its underlying drivers. Moreover, by linking changes in pro￿tability and its drivers
to regulatory and structural changes that have occurred over the 1992-2006 period, we can
better understand the drivers of performance in the Dutch drinking water industry. The two
proceeding sections therefore develop a non-parametric model to do so.
3 Decomposing pro￿t change
Consider n utilities which are using p heterogeneous and non-negative inputs x (x1;:::;xp)
to produce q heterogeneous and non-negative outputs y (y1;:::;yq). The utilities buy inputs
at input prices w (w1;:::;wp) and sell outputs at output prices p (p1;:::;pq), which could
be either exogenously or endogenously determined. Economic pro￿ts ￿t in time period t (t =












where in the remainder of the article we will drop the subscripts and consider the variables
as vectors. In their interesting contributions, Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell (1999, 2008) look at
the change in economic pro￿ts between two time periods and decompose this pro￿t change
into its drivers. In particular, by rearranging the base period and comparison period units,
Laspeyres (i.e. using units of the base period) and Paasche (i.e. using units of the comparison
period) indices are obtained. Firstly, consider the decomposition of the pro￿t change between
period t + 1 and period t into a quantity and a price e⁄ect:
￿t+1 ￿ ￿t =
￿
(yt+1 ￿ yt)pt ￿ (xt+1 ￿ xt)wt￿
+
￿
(pt+1 ￿ pt)yt+1 ￿ (wt+1 ￿ wt)xt+1￿
:
(2)
The quantity e⁄ect (i.e. the ￿rst term in squared brackets) measures for constant base period
prices the impact on pro￿t change arising from the change in outputs relative to the change in
inputs. As such, it measures the performance of the evaluated entity, while eliminating input
and output price ￿ uctuations. The price e⁄ect (i.e. the second term in squared brackets)
estimates for a ￿xed reference basket the impact of input and output price ￿ uctuations on
11the pro￿t change between period t and t + 1. The attractive feature of the Grifell-TatjØ and
Lovell economic pro￿t decompositions is that data from the annual accounts can be used
without assuming pro￿t maximization. In addition, the technique is fully non-parametric as
it does not assume any a priori assumption on the production function.
To understand the latter, consider the two-dimensional Figure 2 with one input x on the
horizontal axis (i.e. p = 1) and one output y on the vertical axis (i.e. q = 1). The production











In a non-parametric setting, the production set is considered as a best practice frontier.
Indeed, consider for example observation (xt;yt). All observations in the fourth quadrant
relatively to (xt;yt) are, for at least the same output production yt, using less inputs (e.g.
observation xA) and, thus, are dominating (xt;yt) in the input-orientation. Moreover, the
observations in the fourth quadrant are, although using maximally the same amount of inputs
xt, producing more outputs (e.g. observation xA
0
) and, thus, are dominating (xt;yt) in the
output-orientation. Undominated observations constitute the best practice frontier and are
de￿ned as relative e¢ cient. Dominated observations lie in the interior of the production set
and are labeled as being relatively ine¢ cient. We analyze the input and output-orientation
more carefully.
Firstly, consider the input-orientation for which we de￿ne the input requirement set Ct(yt)














If an observation is input-e¢ cient it constitutes the input requirement set, i.e. xt 2 ￿Ct(yt).
As suggested by Farrell (1957), for ine¢ cient observations the distance ￿
t to the @Ct(yt) can














Input-e¢ cient observations obtain an e¢ ciency score ￿
t = 1, while ine¢ cient observations
should reduce inputs so that ￿
t < 1 (from (5) it can be seen that the e¢ cient boundary is
obtained by ￿
t ￿ xt). The next section develops a non-parametric model which allows us to
compute the radial contraction by linear programming techniques.
Secondly, consider the output-orientation for which we de￿ne the output correspondence















Output-e¢ cient observations constitute the output correspondence set, i.e. yt 2 ￿Pt(xt),
while for output-ine¢ cient observations the ine¢ ciency ￿














For output-ine¢ cient observations ￿
t> 1 equals the proportionate increase in outputs to
achieve the e¢ cient boundary (see, e.g., Daraio and Simar, 2007).
Thirdly, in the previous analysis both the evaluated observation and its reference obser-
vations, which potentially constitute the best practice frontier, are assumed to be from the
same time period t. However, this could easily be extended to other assumptions. For ex-
ample, ￿
t+1(xt;yt) measures the input-e¢ ciency for observation (xt;yt) with respect to the
reference period t+1, for which the best practice corresponds in Figure 2 to observation xB.
Similarly, the radial distance from (xt+1;yt+1) to the best practice xC in reference period
t+1 corresponds to ￿
t+1(xt+1;yt+1). By technical progress or regress from the best practices,
also the technology set ￿ can shift between two time periods. If observations are able to
produce the same amount of outputs with less resources, technical progress occurs and the
production set moves outwards (i.e. ￿t ￿ ￿t+1). Similarly, technical regress occurs when
observations need more inputs to produce a given set of outputs, so that the production set
moves inwards (i.e. ￿t+1 ￿ ￿t). Having de￿ned these concepts, we further decompose the
pro￿t change in Equation (2).
We enrich the pro￿t decomposition by allowing for relative ine¢ ciencies. Analyzing in-
e¢ ciencies requires an assumption on the orientation. For the remainder of this article, we
will focus on the input-orientation as this is the most natural in our empirical application.
Indeed, drinking water utilities should try to reduce the consumed resources given exogenous
drinking water production (i.e. by demand side management policy, drinking water utilities
cannot promote consumption). Allowing for ine¢ ciencies, the change in pro￿ts could be
driven by increases in productivity or by improvements in the activity mix (all expressed in
base period prices). This can be seen by further decomposing the quantity e⁄ect as follows:
(yt+1 ￿ yt)pt ￿ (xt+1 ￿ xt)wt = [(xt ￿ xA)wt ￿ (xt+1 ￿ xC)wt + (xA ￿ xB)wt]
+[(yt+1 ￿ yt)pt ￿ (xC ￿ xB)wt]:
(8)
The ￿rst term in squared brackets is referred to as the productivity e⁄ect and measures
the sum of the impact on pro￿t change resulting from (1) the evaluated entity￿ s e¢ ciency
improvement relative to the best practice frontier (i.e. the di⁄erence between the ￿rst two



























Figure 2: The production set in t and t+1
0) in the sector between period t and t+1. The former component is denoted as the operating
e¢ ciency (or catch-up e⁄ect), while the latter component is labeled as technical change. An
increase in operating e¢ ciency has a positive in￿ uence on pro￿t change, as does technical
progress. Using the input-oriented e¢ ciency scores ￿, which measure excessive input use for
a given output set, we can deduce the unobserved inputs xA, xB and xC as, respectively,
￿
t(xt;yt) ￿ xt, ￿
t+1(xt;yt) ￿ xt and ￿
t+1(xt+1;yt+1) ￿ xt+1 (i.e. the radial projection of xt
and xt+1 on the respective frontier). The practical computation of ￿ is explored in the next
section.
The second term in squared brackets evaluates the impact on pro￿t change arising from
the shift in activities. In particular, the activity e⁄ect measures for constant base period prices
the changes in scale and scope between period t and t+1. To illustrate the activity e⁄ect more
carefully, consider the two-dimensional Figure 3 with two input variables x1 and x2 on the
axes. The above mentioned e¢ cient input boundary Ct+1(yt) indicates the minimum input
requirements to produce a given output level yt by the best practice technology available in
t+1. To produce e¢ ciently the base period output level yt in the reference period (note that
this graph assumes technical progress as Ct(yt) ￿ Ct+1(yt) and thus less inputs are required
to produce the same amount of outputs) xB inputs are needed. Increasing the outputs, but
holding the output mix similar to yt, requires in the input-e¢ cient situation xD inputs. The



























Figure 3: Input e¢ cient boundaries
The output scale e⁄ect is visualized in the two-dimensional Figure 4 with two outputs
y1 and y2 on the axes. The output correspondence set Pt+1(xB) measures the maximally
obtainable outputs which are producible by the best practice technology in t + 1 and the
input level xB. Increasing the inputs to the level of xD, but holding the output mix constant
to yt, the output scale e⁄ect is measured as yE ￿ yt (again, technical progress is assumed in
the graph).
From Figure 3, for a given production of outputs in reference period t+1, we can infer
the shift in input use from base period t to reference period t+1. This is visualized by the
di⁄erence between the e¢ cient input level for producing yt+1 (but holding the input mix
similar as in the base period) and the e¢ cient input level xC in t+1. The obtained di⁄erence
xD ￿ xC is labelled as the resource mix e⁄ect. Similarly, we can deduce from Figure 4 the
product mix e⁄ect as the shift in outputs from yE to yt+1.
Together, the resource mix (￿rst term in Equation 9), product mix (second term) and
scale e⁄ect (di⁄erence between the last two terms) constitute the activity e⁄ect:
(yt+1 ￿ yt)pt ￿ (xC ￿ xB)wt =
(xD ￿ xC)wt ￿ (yE ￿ yt+1)pt + (xB ￿ xD)wt ￿ (yt ￿ yE)pt:
(9)
The unobserved inputs xD and outputs yE can be obtained from, respectively, the ine¢ ciency
relatively to the e¢ cient input requirement frontier ￿
t+1(xt;yt+1) ￿ xt and the ine¢ ciency
relative to the e¢ cient output correspondence frontier ￿
t+1(xD;yt)￿yt. In the next section,















Figure 4: Output e¢ cient boundaries
production technology, and while allowing for noise and heterogeneity in the data.
4 Non-parametrically estimating e¢ cient quantities
To decompose the pro￿t change into a technical change, operating e¢ ciency, product mix,
resource mix, scale and price e⁄ects, unobserved quantities xA; xB; xC; xD and yE have to
be deduced. As shown before, these can be obtained by linking the ine¢ ciency estimates
￿ and ￿ to the observed quantities (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1). To estimate the ine¢ ciencies,
Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell (1999, 2008) suggest a sequential Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
model to recover the unobserved quantities from observed input-output combinations. We
extend and improve their approach by developing a non-parametric DEA model (see Section
4.1) which allows for noise and uncertainty in the data (Section 4.2) and which takes into
account heterogeneity in the sample (Section 4.3). The model is constructed step by step in
the following subsections.
4.1 DEA in panel data
To evaluate the e¢ ciency of entities, several techniques have been proposed. In this sec-
tion, we concentrate on the popular Free Disposal Hull (FDH) (Deprins et al., 1984) and
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978) models which both estimate the
ine¢ ciency relative to a best practice frontier. Although both models do not assume any a
16priori speci￿cations of the production function, they rely on, respectively, one and two pre-
sumptions which are easily defendable in the application under study. Both FDH and DEA
assume free disposability of the inputs and outputs: 8(xt;yt) 2 ￿t; if e xt ￿ xt and e yt ￿ yt
then (e xt; e yt) 2 ￿t, or in words: if a particular input-output combination (xt;yt) is feasible,
it should also be possible to produce yt with more inputs and to produce less outputs with
a given input set xt. The corresponding best practice production set is de￿ned as the set of











Having de￿ned the step-wise best practice frontier, the FDH input and output-oriented ef-
￿ciency score are obtained by, respectively, the minimal contraction (i.e. Equation (5)) and
the maximal expansion (i.e. Equation (7)) to reach this non-parametric frontier.
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i=1 ￿i = 1;￿i ￿ 0;i = 1;:::;ng:
(11)
The input and output-oriented e¢ ciencies are obtained by plugging the convex production
set, respectively, in Equation (5) and (7). Derived from the two previous assumptions and the
production sets, it is worth noting that the DEA estimator can alternatively be obtained by
convexifying the FDH e¢ cient boundary. Therefore, we ￿rstly determine the undominated
FDH best practice observations and, secondly, convexify these points. The e¢ cient FDH and
DEA boundary is computed by the radial contraction of the inputs ￿
t(xt;yt)￿xt or the radial
expansion of the outputs ￿
t(xt;yt) ￿ yt. Although the convexity assumption is not always
easy to defend, it is natural when considering pro￿ts (Cherchye and Van Puyenbroeck, 2007).
In order to adapt the FDH and DEA estimators to a panel data set, we use a Window
Analysis technique (e.g. Cooper et al., 2004). A window analysis operates in a panel sample
by the principle of moving averages so that an observation is evaluated against all entities in
its ￿ window￿(i.e. the reference set is enlarged to observations from di⁄erent years). Obviously,
the size of the window (and hence the reference set) will in￿ uence the results. Indeed, a too
large window is unable to detect changes over time, while a too small window dramatically
diminishes the discrimination in the results. By using window analysis we allow for both
technical progress and regress (which is not the case in the sequential DEA analysis of
Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell, 1999 and 2008). Remark that technical regress could arise from
the introduction of costly technology processes (e.g. due to security reasons). In the current
17application, we assume a window size equal to 3 years and limit the scope of the window to
the past. This corresponds to the evaluation of the reference period (i.e. t or t + 1) and the
two proceeding years. However, to test the robustness of this assumption, we experimented
with other window sizes as well (size = 1;:::;6) and found very similar results.
4.2 Allowing for noise in the data
A major disadvantage of the traditional FDH and DEA models lie in their deterministic
nature as they assume that all observations (xt
i;yt
i) belong to the production set of size n,
i.e. Prob((xt
i;yt
i) 2 ￿t) = 1 for all i = 1;:::;n. As such, atypical or outlying observations
(e.g. due to measurement errors) could bias the estimates as they dramatically in￿ uence the
best practice frontier.
Firstly, consider the FDH e¢ ciencies. To reduce the in￿ uence of atypical observations,
Cazals et al. (2002) suggests estimating e¢ ciency relative to a partial best practice frontier
constituted from m < n observations, instead of estimating the e¢ ciency relative to the
full best practice frontier constituted from all n observations. For the evaluated observation
(xt;yt) this robust order-m approach draws for the input or output-orientation a sample of
size m with replacement, respectively, among those xt
i so that yt ￿ yt
i or among those yt
i so
that xt ￿ xt
i. For the obtained sub-sample, the FDH model is computed. After repeating the
sampling and e¢ ciency evaluation B times, the robust FDH score ￿
t;m(xt;yt) and ￿
t;m(xt;yt)
is obtained by taking the arithmetic average of the B ine¢ ciencies (notice that also sampling
statistics can be computed). The partial frontier will shift inwards relatively to the full




t. Following Daraio and Simar
(2007b), the size of the partial frontier m and the number of resamplings B is determined as
the value for which the number of super-e¢ cient observations decreases only marginally by
further increasing m or B (i.e. the percentage of points outside ￿t is rather constant). In
our analysis, we determined m or B equal to 50. However, simulations with other values of
m (e.g. m = 10; 20;:::;70) and B (e.g. B = 25;50;100;200) delivered very similar results.
Secondly, consider the DEA estimates. Daraio and Simar (2007b) suggest a convenient
approach that allows computation of robust e¢ ciencies for the convex DEA model (which
they describe as global DEA e¢ ciency). In a ￿rst step, the robust FDH frontier is computed











i for the output-orientation). In a second step, the robust FDH frontier is
convexi￿ed and the DEA e¢ ciencies are computed. The resulting DEA estimates are robust
for noise and uncertainty in the data.
As the evaluated observation does not constitute its reference set in every of the B draw-
ings, the robust FDH and DEA estimates can result in ￿ super-e¢ cient￿e¢ ciency scores (i.e.
￿
t;m > 1 or ￿
t;m < 1). However, as ￿ super-e¢ cient￿e¢ ciency is inconsistent with the pro￿t
18decomposition framework, these super-e¢ cient observations could result in biased pro￿t de-
composition estimates. We therefore adopt the common practice in the traditional FDH or
DEA framework, and treat any super-e¢ cient observations as e¢ cient (i.e. we set ￿
t;m > 1
or ￿
t;m < 1 equal to 1).
The robust FDH and DEA estimates are attractive for several reasons. Firstly, they re-
duce the in￿ uence of atypical and outlying observations and, thus, allow for noise in the data.
Secondly, by estimating e¢ ciency relatively to a partial frontier (m < n), the robust esti-
mation technique reduces the sample size bias (for a simulation, see De Witte and Marques,
2008). Indeed, Zhang and Bartels (1998) indicate that the individual and average e¢ ciency
of the observations in the data set decreases as the number of observations in the sample
increases. This issue is mostly neglected in DEA applications. Finally, the order-m procedure
can easily be extended to conditional e¢ ciency measures which incorporate heterogeneity in
the estimates (next subsection).
4.3 Taking into account heterogeneity
Up to now, we assumed that all observations are evaluated against the same frontier con-
structed from the overall best practices in the subsample of size m. However, this is a rather
blunt approach as there might arise signi￿cant heterogeneity among the observations. Some
observations could operate in a favorable (unfavorable) environment which acts as a sub-
stitutive input (output) and, thus, increases (decreases) the e¢ ciency scores. To take into
account the operational environment non-parametrically, Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) pro-
pose to compare like with likes. This is implemented by conditioning on the environmental
variable zt
i by the use of a non-parametric Kernel function K(:) (any Kernel with compact
support delivers almost the same results, and in our application we have therefore opted for
an Epanechnikov Kernel). The appropriate bandwidth h of the Kernel function is selected
by the cross-validation principle (Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007).
Firstly, consider the robust conditional FDH e¢ ciencies which are obtained by adapting
the previously outlined order-m sampling procedure as follows: for each of the B draws,




j=1 K((zt ￿ zt
i)=h) among those xt
i such that yt
i ￿ yt for the input-orientation, or
among those yt
i such that xt
i ￿ xt for the output-orientation. Relative to these environment-
adjusted reference samples, we then proceed as discussed in the preceding sub-sections: we
￿rst estimate the input or output-oriented FDH model relatively to the reference sample;
then re-do this B times; and ￿nally average the B e¢ ciency evaluations to obtain the robust
conditional FDH e¢ ciency estimate ￿
t;m(xt;ytjzt) and ￿
t;m(xt;ytjzt).
Secondly, the global robust and conditional DEA e¢ ciency score is (similarly as before)
obtained by convexifying for every observation its robust conditional FDH frontier and esti-
19mating relative to this convex frontier the e¢ ciency.
In the remainder of this article, we will focus on these robust conditional DEA estimates
constructed in a window analysis. To compute by this model the unobserved quantities
xA = ￿
t;m(xt;ytjzt) ￿ xt; xB = ￿
t+1;m(xt;ytjzt) ￿ xt ; xC = ￿
t+1;m(xt+1;yt+1jzt+1) ￿ xt+1 ;
xD = ￿
t+1;m(xt;yt+1jzt+1)￿xt and yE = ￿
t+1;m(xD;ytjzt)￿yt, both the evaluated observation
and the period of its reference observations have to be adapted accordingly in the outlined
model. This model modi￿cation is rather straightforward. In the next section, we apply
the robust conditional e¢ ciency estimates to compute the unobserved quantities in a pro￿t
decomposition of the Dutch drinking water utilities. As such, we try to explore the impact
of sunshine regulation and regulatory discussions in the sector.
5 Pro￿ts and productivity in the Dutch drinking water
sector
As is indicated in Section 2, the introduction of the sunshine regulation was a landmark in
the reform of the Dutch drinking water sector. In addition to this benchmarking project,
shifting ideas on the organization of the drinking water sector created several periods of
relative instability. In this section, we empirically explore these movements by, using the
previously outlined models, decomposing pro￿t change into its drivers. We ￿rst describe the
data and continue with the empirical results.
The panel data set consists of water only companies in the period 1992-2006 (there are
no integrated water and sewerage companies in the Netherlands). All data are obtained
from annual accounts, sector publications by Vewin and the periodic benchmark reports. To
reduce the impact of in￿ ation in the analysis, all monetary values are expressed in 1995 euro
(in thousands and using the consumer price index of the Dutch O¢ ce for Statistics, Centraal
Bureau voor Statistiek). Our sample consists of a set of 19 water utilities in 1992, and all these
￿rms or the successor ￿rms that resulted from mergers between them in subsequent years.2
With the minor exception of the impact of the merger in 2003, comparison of aggregate data
for our sample across time provides a consistent estimate of trends in the sector. Moreover, to
investigate the underlying dynamics in the sector as well as possible, we did not exclude the
mergers from the sample (as e.g. Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell (1999) did). To allow for mergers,
we construct for the year of the merger t from the sub-utilities the ￿ merged￿￿rm (i.e. the
sum of the sub-utilities). By doing so, we can estimate the change in variables between year
t (i.e. the merged utility composed from its sub-utilities) and t + 1 (when data from the
2Thus, while the number of ￿rms declines to only 10 in 2006, the geographic coverage of the ￿rms rep-
resented in the sample remains the same, although we must note one minor exception to this as in 2003 a
merger between a ￿rm in our sample, and a ￿rm not previously represented in the sample took place.
20newly merged ￿rm are available) without biasing pro￿t change.3 Aggregate statistics for our
sample are provided in Table 1.
To calculate economic pro￿ts and, thus, pro￿t change, total economic costs (operating
costs and the opportunity cost of capital) are subtracted from turnover. Further decompo-
sition in the determinants of pro￿t change requires the revelation of unobserved quantities
and prices by the outlined non-parametric model which uses input and output variables. As
inputs, we decompose total costs into its capital, labor and ￿ other￿component for which we
construct prices and physical measures. Total costs are composed from the sum of operating
expenditures (Opex), depreciation and capital costs. The former term, Opex, is in turn de-
composable to wage costs and other costs. Firstly, the wage costs, as observed in the annual
accounts, are decomposed into a physical proxy, i.e. the number of employees (in full time
equivalents) and its resulting price proxy (i.e. wage costs divided by the number of employ-
ees). Secondly, as there is no appropriate price vector available for other costs, we proxy its
price by the (material) construction price index as annually published by the Dutch O¢ ce for
Statistics. The physical measure of other costs is computed by subtracting wage costs from
Opex and dividing the outcome by the price proxy.4 Thirdly, the total cost of capital consists
of depreciation (from the annual accounts) and the opportunity cost of capital. The latter is
computed by multiplying the real net assets by an assumed opportunity cost. Given the low
risk of bankruptcy (thanks to both the monopolistic nature of the industry and its public
ownership), we take the yield on the 10 year Dutch government bond as the opportunity cost
of capital. The price of capital is then obtained by dividing the total cost of capital by mains
3By construction with this approach the overall estimated individual pro￿t change for a merged ￿rm and
its predecessor companies is unbiased. However, in the sample of 228 individual pro￿t change decompositions
underlying our aggregate results, there exists a theoretical potential for bias in a very small number (i.e. 8)
of individual pro￿t change decompositions for the years where mergers occurred. This further implies that
there is a small potential for bias in the aggregate pro￿t decomposition estimates reported for 1996, 1997,
1998, 2002, and 2006 as mergers occurred in these years.
However, sensitivity analysis (available from the authors upon request) shows that relative to ￿rm size,
the individual pro￿t decompositions for the 8 potentially biased merger observations are in line with the
individual results for the 220 unbiased companies. Trends in the aggregate pro￿t decomposition components
for the set of all companies reported here are also extremely consistent with aggregate trends for the sample
of 228 ￿rms excluding the 8 potentially biased individual observations. Moreover, as the focus of the paper
lies on the in￿uence of sunshine regulation on aggregate sector performance, we would strongly emphasize
that any potential impact of mergers on estimated aggregate trends was vanishingly trivial before 2003. We
are therefore extremely con￿dent that any potential bias from the 8 merger observations does not in￿uence
our conclusion with regard to aggregate sector performance before and after the introduction of the sunshine
regulatory model. While larger ￿rm sizes imply that the mergers taking place from 2003 do have a larger
impact on industry trends, the aggregate trends reported for the full sample still do not deviate signi￿cantly
from those for the sample of ￿rms that did not merge in this period.
4While it would be desirable to further decompose other costs into components such as energy costs,
chemicals, and contracted out services, the necessary data to allow this are not available.
21length (i.e. the physical proxy for capital).
The number of output variables is limited to two in order to avoid di¢ culties with the
degrees of freedom in the non-parametric model (note that thanks to the use of panel data
our analysis largely satis￿es the rules of thumb concerning the minimum required number of
observations, e.g. Cooper et al., 2004) We opted for two consensual output variables related
to production, i.e. production for domestic and non-domestic customers. However, robust-
ness tests with di⁄erent combinations of production and the number of connections (both
aggregated and divided into domestic and non-domestic customers) delivered very similar
results. Output prices are deduced from the annually Water Supply Statistics from Vewin
and measure for domestic and non-domestic customers the average price (which corresponds
to, respectively, the price for 130 m3 and 25,000 m3 of drinking water).
To account for heterogeneity in the data, we estimate the conditional e¢ ciency measure
for the non-parametric model described above. Given that population density is widely con-
sidered to be an important determinant of water utility input requirements, we consider the
population density (computed by number of connections per squared kilometer of network
length) as an environmental variable. Similar results are obtained with the number of con-
nections, soil stability, drinking water quality measures and age of infrastructure (measured
as book value over new value) as exogenous environmental factors.
The sample aggregate pro￿t decompositions are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 and are
visualized in Figures 5 to 7. Cumulative results for the di⁄erent periods are presented in
Table 4. As the current discussion in the Netherlands focuses on aggregate pro￿ts, we present
graphs and tables in aggregate terms rather than in average terms. Additionally, this allows




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23** Period 1992-1997 **
In the period before the introduction of sunshine regulation, the utilities anticipated a po-
tential privatization. Economic pro￿ts increased signi￿cantly (from 4.3 million 1995 euro in
1992 to 179.6 million 1995 euro in 1997). As Table 4 clearly illustrates, 149 percent of this
175.3 million euro increase in pro￿tability was realized because of changes in output and
input prices that bene￿ted the companies. More speci￿cally, output price increases for both
domestic and non-domestic consumers contributed 284.1 million euro to increased pro￿ts (re-
spectively, accounting for 65 and 35% of the output price increase). Contrarily, input prices
increased such that capital, labor and other costs contribute negatively (22.6 million euro)
to pro￿t change. In contrast to the overall positive impact of the price e⁄ect on pro￿ts, the
quantity e⁄ect contributed (in cumulative terms) negatively (i.e. -86.1 million euro). This
negative e⁄ect can mainly be attributed to the negative productivity e⁄ect which decreased
pro￿ts by -83.4 million euro between 1992 and 1997, with almost all of this e⁄ect being at-
tributable to e¢ ciency change (-83.4) and a small component being attributable to negative
technical change (-6.6). Thus, while pro￿ts clearly increased because of price increases to con-
sumers, there is substantial contradictory evidence to suggest that economic performance,
as measured by the quantity e⁄ect, and more speci￿cally operating e¢ ciency, and techni-
cal change actually declined during the period before sunshine regulation was implemented.
While it could be suggested that instability in the sector due to the government￿ s intention
to privatize the water industry resulted in a negative quantity e⁄ect, a more plausible ex-
planation is that large output price increases, in the absence of any e⁄ective mechanism to
incentivize improved performance, resulted in dramatically reduced performance as managers
did not face any e⁄ective pressure to reduce costs. Thus, this result mirros the ￿ndings of
Saal and Parker (2000, 2001) who found that privatisation did not improve performance in
the English and Welsh water sector, until e⁄ective incentive regimes were implemented in
1995.
** Period 1997-2006 **
Our results suggest that the introduction of the sunshine regulatory model in 1997 signif-
icantly altered the behaviour of the utilities. Focusing ￿rst on aggregate pro￿t change we
see that for the entire 1997-2006 period pro￿ts increase by only 29.1 million euro, which was
the result of even smaller aggregate pro￿t increases for each of the 1997-2000, 2000-2003,
and 2003-2006 periods. Relative to the pre sunshine period, pro￿t growth was therefore rela-
tively slow. When we further consider that for the entire 1997-2006 period, lower real output
prices reduced pro￿ts by 103.9 million euro, lower input prices contributed a small positive
e⁄ect of 10.1 million euro, and the quantity e⁄ect contributed 123.0 million euro, this reveals
that after 1997 the sources of pro￿t growth had dramatically altered. For example, over the
24period 1997-2006, positive pro￿t growth was achieved despite considerable reductions in out-
put prices and because of considerable increases in the underlying performance of the water
utilities. Thus, contrary to the pre sunshine regulation period, when productivity growth
and its components (technical change and operating e¢ ciency) were all negative, productiv-
ity growth contributed 145.5 million euro to pro￿t growth between 1997 and 2006, with 79
percent of this change attributable to technical change, and the remainder attributable to
e¢ ciency change.
These results suggest that after 1997 Dutch drinking water utilities operated in an en-
vironment in which pro￿t change was primarily driven by productivity improvements, and
consumers appear to have eventually received a substantial portion of the resulting cost re-
ductions in reduced output prices. However, it is worthwhile to note that while a clear shift
in underlying productivity performance is evident from the introduction of sunshine regula-
tion in 1997 on (Figure 7) the pattern of the output price, quantity, and productivity e⁄ects
suggest that consumer bene￿ts, as well as underlying performance improvements, were most
evident after 2000, and particularly in the 2000-2003 period. As bene￿ts to consumers in
reduced output prices are concentrated in the 2000-2003 and 2003-2006 periods, we would
again note a parallel with the case of the English and Welsh water sector, where a similar
pattern of performance improvements preceding consumer bene￿ts is evident and accepted
on the grounds that ￿rms must retain the bene￿ts of performance improvements for some
period of time in order to provide appropriate incentives. The increasing focus in the me-
dia and in the Dutch academic journals on excessive pro￿ts in the water industry during
this period clearly suggests that the water utilities and/or politicians responded to public
opinion with large output price declines. Moreover, this could be seen as indicative of a
system that is incapable of maintaining appropriate incentives in the face of political pres-
sures from consumers. However we would again counter this with the observation that while
output price reductions led to a 148.4 million euro reduction in economic pro￿ts between
2000 and 2006, economic pro￿ts actually increased form 183.0 to 208.8 million euro over the
same period, suggesting that e¢ ciency incentives had not been dampened. We would ￿nally
note that as the potential establishment of an independent regulator was debated during the
2000-2003 period it is plausible that the industry increased its performance under sunshine
regulation during this period precisely because it sought to avoid the implementation of a
more robust incentive regulation system, and not because sunshine regulation itself enhanced
performance. However, while this is plausible, periodic in earnest discussion of the possible
establishment of an independent regulator, cannot explain the continuing shift to positive
productivity change in every year after 1997 when sunshine regulation was introduced. More-
over, we would also argue, that if the mere threat of movement to an alternative regulatory
system from the preferred sunshine regulatory model is su¢ cient to improve company perfor-
25mance, this threat is always available to policymakers wishing to maintain the e⁄ectiveness
of a sunshine regulation system.
Nevertheless, our models do suggest some negative evidence with regard to underlying
company performance, as over 1997-2006 the activity e⁄ect resulted in pro￿t change of -22.5
million euro. However, closer inspection of Table 4 reveals that in aggregate, this negative
e⁄ect is driven by the resource mix e⁄ect (-142.7) which counteracted a relatively small pos-
itive scale e⁄ect (41.1) and the product mix e⁄ect (79.1), with the latter only being positive
during the 2000-2003 and 2003-2006 periods. The scale e⁄ect result suggests that while on
balance the industry bene￿ted from increased scale, the magnitude of these bene￿ts are quite
small in comparison to productivity improvements. In contrast, the product mix e⁄ect sug-
gests that the product diversi￿cation strategy of many drinking water utilities (i.e. increased
non-domestic production by tailored solutions) and the impact on output structure caused
by mergers had a much larger positive impact on utility performance. Unfortunately, these
positive impacts of restructuring are countered by the large negative resource mix e⁄ect,
which suggests that the net impact of the industry￿ s move to a less labour intensive but more
capital and other input intensive structure, has resulted in increased costs of production.
This is not contradictory to the positive technical change, which implies that the industry is
using a more productive technology, and to the positive e¢ ciency e⁄ect, which implies that
ine¢ cient ￿rms have eliminated technical e¢ ciency. Stated di⁄erently, while the industry
has seen substantial productivity improvements because it has reduced its input usage rel-
ative to outputs, its restructuring e⁄orts have also, unfortunately, resulted in higher than
economically e¢ cient costs because of an increasing misalignment between input prices and
the marginal rate of technical substitution between inputs. However, we would note at least
part of this negative e⁄ect may be explained by the substantial increase in the mains network,
which has been carried out to increase water supply security by allowing transfer of water
resources between previously physically separated networks. As this increase in water supply
security cannot be measured and is therefore not included as an output in the model, this
could potentially result in an overstatement of the negative resource mix e⁄ect. We would
also note that as the expansion of the mains network is certainly designed to allow for future
demand, the substantial capital investment programme pursued in the past 15 years could













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 4: Cumulative e⁄ect (real 1995 euro, thousands)
1992-1997 1997-2006 1997-2000 2000-2003 2003-2006
Pro￿t change 175,308 29,148 4,259 8,360 16,528
Quantity e⁄ect -86,148 123,011 31,899 80,202 10,910
Productivity -83,426 145,464 42,058 45,702 57,704
Technical change -6,553 114,715 16,240 34,308 64,167
Operating e¢ ciency -76,874 30,749 25,818 11,394 -6,463
Activity e⁄ect -2,722 -22,453 -10,159 34,500 -46,794
Product mix 25,036 79,106 -13,419 86,585 5,940
Resource mix -30,396 -142,714 -9,222 -56,673 -76,819
Scale e⁄ect 2,638 41,155 12,482 4,588 24,084
Price e⁄ect 261,456 -93,864 -27,640 -71,842 5,618
Input price -22,680 10,050 -72,146 28,226 53,970
Output price 284,137 -103,914 44,506 -100,068 -48,352
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the conduct of natural monopolies regulated by a sunshine regula-
tory model (i.e. publicizing the performances of utilities). In particular, we decompose the
pro￿t of publicly owned Dutch drinking water utilities into its drivers (price and quantity ef-
fects). We extend the decompositions of Grifell-TatjØ and Lovell (1999, 2008) by an advanced
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model which allows for uncertainty (resulting from noise,
atypical observations, and measurement errors) and heterogeneity in the data (Daraio and
Simar, 2007b).
Our results suggest that after the implementation of sunshine regulation in 1997 the
productivity performance of the publicly owned Dutch drinking water utilities improved
markedly (this in the absence of privatisation and without the establishment of a more
robust incentive regulation system). Thus, while during the period 1992-1997, productivity
declines caused an 83.4 million euro (in 1995 prices) reduction in economic pro￿ts, after
1997 productivity gains contributed 145.464 million euro of increased pro￿tability in the
industry. Moreover, while large increases in output prices in the 1992-1997 period contributed
signi￿cantly to increased economic pro￿ts, output prices fell considerably after 2000. As
economic pro￿ts, nonetheless increased between 2000 and 2006, our results strongly suggest
that this consumer bene￿t did not accrue from inappropriate political interference, but was
instead the result of passing past productivity improvements from producers to consumers.
These results therefore suggest that ￿ naming and shaming￿in a sunshine regulation system





























































































































Figure 7: Productivity e⁄ect decomposition (real 1995 euro, thousands).
such productivity gains are eventually passed to consumers in lower prices. In sum, this
paper suggests that in an appropriate political and institutional context, sunshine regulation
can be an e⁄ective and appropriates means of insuring that publicly provided services are
e¢ ciently and pro￿tably provided.
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